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University of Westminstersitates the presence of a ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ as opposed to ‘mere emotion’. ThisPrivate law courts in the UK have maintained the de minimis threshold as a condition prece-
dent for a successful claim for the infliction of mental harm. This de minimis threshold neces-
standard has also been adopted by the criminal law courts when reading the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861 to include non-physical injury. In determining the cut-off point between
psychiatric injury and mere emotion, the courts have adopted a generally passive acceptance
of expert testimony and the guidelines used by mental health professionals to make diagnoses.
Yet these guidelines were developed for use in a clinical setting, not a legal one. This paper
examines the difficulty inherent in utilising the ‘dimensional’ diagnostic criteria used by men-
tal health professionals to answer ‘categorical’ legal questions. This is of particular concern
following publication of the new diagnostic manual, DSM-V, in 2013, which will further ex-
acerbate concerns about compatibility. It is argued that a new set of diagnostic guidelines,
tailored specifically for use in a legal context, is now a necessity.
Dr Russell Orr, University of Westminster, Westminster Law School, 4–16 Little Titchfield
Street, London W1W 7BY, UK. Email: r.orr@westminster.ac.ukINTRODUCTION
In Whitmore v Euroways Express Coaches Ltd,1 a case that involved a claim for
nervous shock, Comyn J was willing to relax what had become a central component
of English law regarding such claims and awarded damages following the onset of
‘ordinary shock’. While certain academic and judicial commentators may now
conclude that this was an astute observation leading to an easily defensible decision
in keeping with emerging common law precedents in other jurisdictions,2 the Law
Commission has described it as an ‘aberration’3 and has lent its full support to the main-
tenance of the orthodox standard.4 The sacred rule in English private law that Comyn J
was willing to disregard concerns the definition of ‘nervous shock’ itself, and represents
the minimum threshold that must be reached before an individual may seek to recover
damages. As Lord Denning observed in Hinz v Berry, this term has been employed by
the court to cover any ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’.5 This notion of a ‘recognisable* I would like to acknowledge Dr Ciara Hackett for her thoughtful assistance with the prepa-
ration of this manuscript.
1. ‘Whitmore v Euroways Express Coaches Ltd’ The Times 4 May 1984.
2. NJ Mullany and PR Handford Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage (Sydney: Law Book
Company, 1993) pp 18–21.
3. Law Commission Report No 249 Liability for Psychiatric Illness (London: HMSO, 1998).
4. Negligence (Psychiatric Illness) Bill ss 1(2), 2(2), 5(2).
5. Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40, Denning MR at 42.
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2 Legal Studiespsychiatric illness’, as opposed to mere grief, distress or other emotion, is one that has
held particular sway with the courts, having been restated on numerous occasions in
both the House of Lords6 and the Court of Appeal.7 The standard test is most commonly
attributed to Lord Bridge, who, in the McLoughlin case, noted:
The common law gives no damages for the emotional distress which any normal per-
son experiences when someone he loves is killed or injured. Anxiety and depression
are normal human emotions. Yet an anxiety neurosis or reactive depression may be
recognisable psychiatric illnesses, with or without psychosomatic symptoms. So the
first hurdle which a plaintiff claiming damages of the kind in question must surmount
is to establish that he is suffering, not merely grief, distress or any other normal emo-
tion, but a positive psychiatric illness.8
Given a plain text reading, this test may seem relatively straightforward. Indeed,
the apparent logic of such a de minimis threshold has no doubt contributed to its
subsequent application in criminal law as well as private law, particularly with re-
gard to the courts’ reading of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to include
the infliction of non-physical harm. Yet in reaching his decision, Comyn J
reviewed the relevant case-law extant at the time and, while conceding that ortho-
doxy required the presence of a recognised psychiatric condition, also identified
that ‘no absolutely clear picture emerges and many of the judgments speak with
different voices’.9
This paper will examine in detail the many and varied rationales, and subse-
quent problems, that have emerged in relation to the retention of this test in both
private and criminal law. In particular, the focus shall be on the law’s reliance on
mental health science in maintaining this threshold. While the desire to defer to
medical knowledge in determining the cut-off point between ‘mere emotion’
and ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ is understandable, it will be argued that the
increasingly passive position adopted by the courts belies the fundamental incom-
patibility between the questions of ultimate concern in the law, and the medical
criteria used to make a clinical diagnosis. It will be demonstrated that this incom-
patibility has been exacerbated yet further by the publication of the latest edition
of the diagnostic manual, the DSM-V, in 2013. To combat this, it will be
suggested that law makers should engage more proactively with the mental health
sciences and seriously consider the creation of diagnostic guidelines specifically
for use in the legal arena. While such suggestions have previously been dismissed
on the grounds of practicality, the emergence of the diagnostically weak ‘battered
woman syndrome’ (BWS) as a relevant consideration in abused partner cases
serves as an excellent example of the courts’ ability to proactively engage
with the mental health sciences and tailor medical knowledge to their own
specific needs.6. Alcock v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL)422; Hicks v CC of South
Yorkshire Police [1992] PIQR 433 (HL) 436; Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 (HL) 167, 171,
181, 189, 197; White (Frost) v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 (HL)469, 491,
501.
7. Attia v British Gas plc [1988] QB 304 (CA) 320; Hicks v CC of South Yorkshire Police
[1992] 1 All ER 690 (CA) 693.
8. McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] AC 410 at 431 (Lord Bridge).
9. Above n 1.
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 3PRIVATE LAW
The courts first displayed a willingness to engage with psychological and psychiatric
principles of diagnosis as they pertain to claims for psychiatric injury due to negligence.
In common law, the courts’ orthodox position on accepting the reality of psychiatric in-
jury and thus permitting negligence claims for such conditions can trace its roots to the
latter years of the nineteenth century in the Irish case of Bell v Great Northern Railway
Co of Ireland,10 and to the turn of the twentieth century and the English case ofDulieu v
White & Sons.11 In each of these cases, the courts ruled for the first time that parties in
breach of a duty could be held liable in negligence for causing some form of psychiatric
injury so long as the victim’s condition could be shown to have derived from a reason-
able fear of personal injury. In the Dulieu case, Phillimore J stated that ‘terror wrong-
fully induced and inducing physical mischief gives a cause of action’.12 The
judgments in these cases marked a significant evolution in the thinking of the courts.
Previously, the orthodox position was characterised by a belief that in order for any kind
of nervous shock to be recoverable, it must also have been accompanied by a concurrent
physical injury. LordWensleydale had commented that, ‘Mental pain or anxiety the law
cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of
causes that alone.’13 Indeed, in 1888 the Privy Council had decided, in the Australian
case of Coultas,14 that psychiatric harm caused by fear of being run over by a train
was too remote a condition to warrant a successful claim.
This initial reluctance to engage with the notion of psychiatric injury without an ac-
companying physical injury, as characterised by Lord Wensleydale, and the Privy
Council judgment in Coultas, is perhaps understandable given the paucity of psycho-
logical/psychiatric evidence available at the time. Indeed, the courts are to be praised
for the alacrity with which they were willing to engage with any notion of psychiatric
injury as a result of negligence given the relative infancy of research based mental
health science at that time. Less praiseworthy has been the speed with which private
law courts have been willing to incorporate more contemporary terminologies to de-
scribe mental health issues; for example, from a mental health perspective, the contin-
ued use of ‘nervous shock’ as the umbrella term to describe all psychiatric injury is of
itself problematic. As Trindade has correctly noted, this is a relatively crude expression
that fails to properly encapsulate the breadth of contemporary mental health science.15
While the retention of such outmoded terminology may itself be indicative of limited
engagement with contemporary mental health science, as Lord Bridge stated, it is
now accepted that it is possible for a claim in negligence to succeed without any phys-
ical component, provided that the symptoms exceed ‘mere emotion’ and amount to a
recognisable psychiatric injury. In determining the cut-off point between mere emotion
and ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’, the courts have, for the most part, adopted a pas-
sive stance and been willing to defer to mental health practitioners, and the diagnostic
criteria developed by the mental health sciences designed to aid suitably trained experts
to make clinical diagnoses. As Lord Steyn commented, ‘Where the line is to be drawn is10. (1890) 26 LR Ir 428.
11. [1901] 2KB 669.
12. Ibid, at 683.
13. Lynch v Knight [1861] 9 HLC 577 at 590 (Lord Wensleydale).
14. Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 App CAS 222.
15. FATrindade ‘The principles governing the recovery of damages for negligently caused ner-
vous shock’ (1986) 45(3) Camb L J 476–500.
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4 Legal Studiesa matter for expert psychiatric evidence.’16 This position is fully endorsed by the Law
Commission who have stated that ‘… expert medical evidence will generally be re-
quired to establish that the plaintiff has suffered a recognisable psychiatric illness’,17
and by some academic commentators.18CRIMINAL LAW
In comparison, criminal courts have generally demonstrated greater willingness to en-
gage actively with contemporary mental health science. The explanation for this is doubt-
less rooted in the frequent characterisation of English criminal law as an adversarial
struggle between the accused/defendant and the state.19 The relative disparity in re-
sources between a private individual charged with a crime and the various branches of
the state that are responsible for conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions
has received extensive judicial and academic comment.20 As a direct consequence of this
‘adversarial deficit’, great efforts have been taken to ensure that the rights of defendants –
and, indeed, the reliability and integrity of criminal proceedings – are not unduly im-
pinged upon at either the ‘evidential stage’ of the criminal process21 or during the trial
itself. Increasingly, mental health sciences have played an important role in maintaining
this integrity with psychologists and psychiatrists being employed by the court in myriad
situations. These range from participation in drafting some of the comprehensive guide-
lines provided for the police in the codes of practice that accompany the Police and Crim-
inal Evidence Act (PACE) regarding the appropriate measures to be observed when
interviewing vulnerable individuals, including the need for an appropriate adult (AA)
to be in attendance,22 through the extensive testing of defendants to ensure that their
levels of suggestibility and/or compliance are not sufficiently high to render confession
evidence unreliable,23 to more general assessments of an individual’s fitness to plead
or stand trial.24 While the effective use of both psychology and psychiatry to help ensure
that both the rights of the defendant and the reliability of the criminal process are main-
tained is commendable, critics have argued that this application of mental health science
to ‘evidential’ issues belies what can only be described as a traditionally reticent view of
emotional harm in the criminal law, particularly as regards victimhood.2516. White, above n 6, at 491 (Lord Steyn).
17. Ibid, at n 3 (para 2.3).
18. See eg P Case ‘Secondary iatrogenic harm: claims for psychiatric damage following a death
caused by medical error’ (2004) 67 Mod L Rev 561.
19. AAshworth and R Redmayne The Criminal Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th
edn, 2010).
20. Ibid; H Stacey and M Lavarch Beyond the Adversarial System (Sydney: The Federation
Press, 1999).
21. MZander The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th edn, 2005).
22. PACE code 3; S Young et al ‘The effectiveness of police custody assessments in identifying
suspects with intellectual disabilities and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder’. (2013) 11 BMC
Med 248; B Littlechild and D Fearns ‘Mentally vulnerable adults in police detention’ in Mental
Disorder and Criminal Justice (Lyme Regis: Russell House, 2005).
23. GH Gudjonsson The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook
(Chichester: Wiley, 2003).
24. R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C&P 303: The Pritchard Test.
25. E Erez ‘Who’s afraid of the big bad victim? Victim impact statements as victim empower-
ment and enhancement of justice’ (1999) 49(26) Crim L Rev 545.
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 5The traditional position adopted by criminal courts in the UK has been one of
extreme reluctance to engage with, or criminalise, behaviour that inflicts psycholog-
ical harm on a victim without some accompanying physical injury.26 This prevail-
ing focus on a tangible physical injury in criminal law closely mirrors the
traditional position in tort, outlined above, which accorded a certain primacy to
claims arising out of physical injury.27 This is particularly relevant as regards the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (the 1861 Act), which sets the standard def-
initions for a range of non-fatal injuries. Given the era in which this statute was
drafted, it is perhaps unsurprising that no specific mention is made of emotional
or psychiatric injury but, rather, the focus is very much on varying degrees of
‘bodily’ or physical injury. In spite of this apparently narrow legislative framework,
the courts have introduced a broader reading of what constitutes ‘injury’ in a crim-
inal context to include psychiatric harm. This willingness to extend protection to
individuals who develop a ‘psychiatric illness’ as a result of another’s behaviour
can be neatly highlighted with reference to the conjoined cases of R v Ireland
and R v Burstow.28 First, in R v Ireland, it was held that repeatedly making silent
telephone calls to someone resulting in their developing a psychiatric illness can
constitute actual bodily harm within the meaning given to that offence in the
1861 Act.29 Similarly, in R v Burstow, the court held that stalking someone to
the point at which they develop a psychiatric illness can constitute grievous bodily
harm.30 While these cases are indicative of the court’s willingness to engage with
the constraints imposed upon it by outdated legislation, it is crucial to note that
any extension of criminal liability to include the infliction of non-physical injury
must clearly still be couched within the strict tort standard of having caused a
‘recognisable psychiatric illness’ as opposed to mere emotion.
This point was reinforced in the Chan-Fook case by Hobhouse LJ, who commented:
The phrase ‘actual bodily harm’ is capable of including psychiatric injury, but it does
not include mere emotions such as fear, distress or panic, nor does it include, as such,
states of mind that are not in themselves evidence of some identifiable clinical
condition.31
Indeed, the court went further by declaring, per curiam, that ‘state of mind’ was
an ‘unscientific expression’ and therefore unhelpful in deciding if a psychiatric in-
jury had occurred; rather, expert evidence from a psychiatrist or psychologist
would be required.32 Should such expert testimony not be introduced by the pros-
ecution, the matter should not be left to the jury for consideration.33 This apparent
willingness to defer to the scientific rigour offered by a clinical diagnosis and to
rely on expert testimony from mental health professionals closely mirrors the ap-
proach adopted in private law detailed above.26. JE Stannard ‘Sticks, stones and words: emotional harm and the English criminal law’
(2010) 74 J Crim L 533–556.
27. Ibid; H TeffCausing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of Legal
Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).
28. R v Burrows, R v Ireland [1998] AC 147.
29. Ibid, at 158 (Lord Steyn).
30. Ibid, at 161 (Lord Steyn).
31. R v Chan-Fook (1994) 99 Cr App R 147 at 152 (Hobhouse LJ).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
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6 Legal StudiesThe key concern for both private and criminal courts therefore seems to be in estab-
lishing a cut-off point between ‘mere emotions’ and clinical symptoms amounting to
psychiatric injury, with expert testimony playing a key role in this process. This willing-
ness to defer to the expertise of mental health practitioners and the diagnostic criteria
that they use no doubt seems logical, particularly in light of the commonly held miscon-
ception that there exists a ‘considerable degree of international agreement on the clas-
sification of mental disorders and their diagnostic criteria’.34 While it may be true that
on those occasions when experts are in agreement their testimony can be of significant
value to the courts,35 as shall be seen, disagreements when they arise can lead to con-
fusion and uncertainty.DIAGNOSTIC DISAGREEMENTS
In private law, the propensity for practitioners to reach different conclusions is neatly
evidenced in the Scottish case of Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd.36 In that case, three
different psychiatrists each came to different conclusions as to both the severity of the
condition suffered by the plaintiff and the very nature of the condition itself. One expert
returned a diagnosis of a moderate depressive episode which was subsequently changed
to a diagnosis of dysthymia; the second witness diagnosed a depressive disorder; and
the final expert diagnosed an adjustment disorder. Furthermore, it was reported in the
case that one of the experts was dismissive of the value of the diagnostic criteria them-
selves, having preferred to rely on his own clinical judgment, and that yet another was
dismissive of the evidence provided by one of his colleagues, noting that the terminol-
ogy used was old-fashioned.37
Similar disagreements between expert witnesses can readily be found in a criminal
context; the case of Dhaliwal38 provides a particularly harrowing example of this. In that
case, the defendant was chargedwith causing grievous bodily harm contrary to s 20 of the
1861Act, andmanslaughter following the suicide of his wife. In support of these charges,
evidence was adduced that showed the defendant had subjected his wife to sustained
abuse which, while mostly psychological in nature, had also included clear incidents
of physical assault.39 In spite of the clear evidence to suggest that this man’s conduct
had led directly to his wife’s suicide, he was acquitted on both counts. The reasons for
this acquittal were twofold. First, although there had clearly been instances of physical
assault, the prosecution were unable to establish a direct causal link between these as-
saults and the victim’s suicide.40 Had they been able to establish such a direct causal link
between the physical assaults endured by the victim and her death, the prosecution case
would have been relatively straightforward, but instead the focus shifted on to the second
issue; the exact nature of the psychological harm experienced by the victim. In keeping
with the direction in Chan-Fook, in attempting to establish the severity of the victim’s34. Sutherland v Hatton [2002] 2 All ER 1 at 5 (Hale LJ).
35. Monk v PC Harrington Ltd [2008] EWHC 1879 (QB).
36. Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd [2009] Scot (D) 3/11 (Sheriff Court, Kircaldy, 4
September 2009).
37. Ibid, at 22 (Sheriff Braid).
38. R v Dhaliwal [2006] EWCA Crim 1139.
39. Ibid, at 3.
40. Ibid, at 8.
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 7condition at the time of her death, the prosecution commissioned expert reports from no
less than three independent mental health professionals; one clinical psychologist with
expertise in cases involving abused partners, Dr Roxanne Agnew-Davies, and two distin-
guished consultant psychiatrists, Dr Gillian Mezey and Dr LP Chesterman.41
It should be noted that in coming to their conclusions, none of these experts had the
opportunity to meet and formally assess the victim. Instead, they were provided with per-
sonal diaries of the deceased and had access to evidence gathered by the police. While all
of the experts agreed that the victim had clearly been subjected to a great deal of emo-
tional and physical abuse, only Dr Mezey concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to diagnose a recognised psychiatric illness, specifically clinical depression.42 Dr Ag-
new-Davies acknowledged that the victim’s ordeal had led to the presence of several
symptoms of depression and PTSD, but could not be satisfied without formal assessment
that these symptoms reached the required standard for a clinical diagnosis. Similarly,
while Dr Chesterman had no hesitation in concluding that the victim’s psychological
functioning had clearly been impaired by sustained abuse, noting that ‘[The] psycholog-
ical impact of the assault perpetrated by her husband on the day of her suicide is likely to
have been greatly magnified by the number of such experiences over many years’,43 he
was unable to confirm that this psychological impairment had resulted in a recognised
psychiatric illness.
As a consequence of this inconsistency between the experts reports produced, the
prosecution were forced to concede that there was no recognised psychiatric illness
and to proceed with the case on the basis that the psychological impairment suffered
by the victim was sufficient to constitute bodily injury.44 This proposition was rejected
by both the trial judge and on appeal, with the appeal court restating the orthodox po-
sition that only a recognisable psychiatric illness could constitute bodily harm.
Dimensional answers to categorical questions
In trying to explain why such disagreements occur, it is necessary to examine howmen-
tal health practitioners reach diagnoses. The diagnostic criteria used by mental health
practitioners to determine the presence and extent of any psychiatric illness are
contained within two separate systems, the ICD 10, published by the World Health Or-
ganization,45 and the DSM-V,46 published by the American Psychiatric Association.47
Despite its traditional reputation for reliability,48 the capacity for disagreement between
practitioners, particularly within the finite timescale available for assessment in legal
proceedings, is arguably unavoidable given the formulation of the DSM.49 While it is41. Ibid, at 13.
42. Ibid, at 14.
43. Ibid, at 15.
44. Ibid, at 18.
45. The consultation process preceding the release of the ICD-11 is currently ongoing.
46. DSM-V The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Washington, DC:
American Psychiatric Association, 5th edn, 2013).
47. For the purposes of this paper, greater emphasis will be place on the role of the DSM as it
focuses solely on mental health diagnoses. The ICD 10 is a general classification of all diagnos-
able conditions, with those pertaining to mental health being contained in ch 5.
48. RMayes and AHorowitz ‘DSM-III and the revolution in the classification of mental illness’
(2005) 41(3) J Hist Behav Sci 249.
49. H Kennedy ‘Limits of psychiatric evidence in civil courts and tribunals: science and sensi-
bility’ (2004) 10 Med-L J Ireland 16 at 18.
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
8 Legal Studiesof course preferable, for the purposes of reliability, that two different clinicians viewing
the same patient should come to the same clinical diagnosis, the checklist approach ex-
emplified by diagnostic manuals does not, on a plain text reading, allow for full consid-
eration of the contextual information and clinical experience that each practitioner may
use in making his or her final assessment.50 Any disagreements that emerge in the or-
dinary course of clinical practice can usually be resolved by additional, more detailed
assessments, a luxury not often afforded by the courts.51
This issue serves to highlight the crucial point that these criteria were not developed
specifically for use in a legal environment, which places a substantially different em-
phasis on the criteria than that which is applied in a purely clinical setting. From a clin-
ical perspective, reliability in a diagnosis is important in facilitating appropriate
treatment, yet in a legal context, the courts are simply concerned with whether or not
the symptoms experienced by the claimant reach the de minimis threshold of
recognisable psychiatric injury.52 In other words, the courts are seeking a categorical
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer as to the presence of a recognised condition. However, while the
conditions listed in the DSMmay appear categorical, they are in fact frequently dimen-
sional, being composed of a series of clinically important symptoms that in practice oc-
cur in varying levels of severity, and which in turn may be relevant to multiple different
diagnoses.53 This adds greatly to the difficulty inherent in coming to a final diagnosis.
This fundamental difference in approach has led to much difficulty in satisfactorily
applying the diagnostic criteria in a legal context.54 It is perhaps for this reason that
in several instances judges have been willing to extend leeway to expert witnesses re-
garding the extent to which they frame their testimony within the language of the diag-
nostic criteria. Morland J in particular has commented that these strict categorisations
are of limited value, noting that the persuasiveness of the testimony, rather than the spe-
cific label used to describe the condition in question, is what matters to the court.55 A
similar attitude has been expressed in the Irish case of Murtagh v MOD,56 where the
court makes specific reference to the ‘wealth of experience’ and ‘clinical diagnostic ex-
pertise’ of the witness being of greater importance than ‘formulaic categorisations’.
Other judgments have also dammed the diagnostic criteria with faint praise by describ-
ing them as ‘a useful guide’,57 but ‘not necessarily conclusive’.58 Such an approach to
expert witnesses presents a real danger that it is the persuasiveness of the expert rather
than the severity of the symptoms that may ultimately decide the outcome of a case.
The judge as mental health expert
Perhaps more troublingly, from the perspective of the mental health practitioner, there are
also several examples of the court making its own interpretation of the diagnostic criteria50. D Gill ‘Proving and disproving psychiatric injury’ (2008) 78 Med-L J 143.
51. Kennedy, above n 49.
52. Noble v Owens [2008] EWHC 359 (QB).
53. DA Grayson ‘Can categorical and dimensional views of psychiatric illness be distin-
guished?’ (1987) 151 Br J Psych 355.
54. Dickie, above n 36, at 33 (Sheriff Braid). An excellent example of this can be seen in Sheriff
Braid’s summary of the submissions pertinent to the Dickie case and the conclusion that ‘… the
diagnosis of psychiatric illness in not an exact science!’
55. Group B Plaintiffs v UKMRC [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 161 (QB) at 113 (Moorland J).
56. [2008] IEHC at 292.
57. Gardner v Epirotiki Steamship Co (QBD, 7 June 1994) Wright J.
58. Rorrison v West Lothian College [2000] SCLR 245 Lord Reed.
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 9without the aid of trained mental health experts, an approach no doubt facilitated by the
checklist appearance of these criteria in the diagnostic manuals,59 and the difficulty in se-
curing consistent expert testimony. In both England60 and Australia,61 courts have ap-
plied what Brigg J has termed a ‘common sense application of the DSM-IV criteria’,62
in determining if the symptoms required for a diagnosis of pathological gambling were
present. Similarly, with regard to the veracity of a claim based upon the presence of
PTSD, Evans LJ seemed dismissive of the need for expert testimony, at least initially, pre-
ferring instead an examination of the ‘factual evidence’ about the claimant’s behaviour
based on his own interpretation of the symptoms listed in the diagnostic manual.63 The
temptation for the court to indulge in this kind of analysis is perhaps understandable,
given both the propensity for practitioners to disagree about a diagnosis and the checklist
presentation of symptoms in the DSM that may, on an initial inspection, seem self-ex-
planatory to even the most clinically inexperienced reader; nevertheless, judicial restraint
should be employed as far as is practical.
As has been discussed, the checklist appearance of symptoms belies the requisite un-
derlying clinical expertise and judgment required to fully diagnose a condition. Further-
more, as Gill noted, a more detailed reading of both the DSM and the ICD diagnostic
manuals reveals a series of subtle caveats that accompany the more clearly stated list
of symptoms, and that these caveats must be fully considered before arriving at any re-
liable diagnosis; yet this process is frequently overlooked in the legal arena.64 Indeed,
the DSM itself contains a specific warning about the dangers inherent in an interpreta-
tion of symptoms without the requisite clinical expertise:
When DSM categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic
purposes, there is a risk that diagnostic information will be misused or misunder-
stood. These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ul-
timate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.65
The importance of policy considerations
In spite of these fundamental concerns surrounding the utility of these diagnostic standards
in a legal setting, their continued use has received additional judicial support after Burnton
LJ restated the importance of the diagnostic criteria in establishing the presence of a
recognisable psychiatric illness.66 That this standard is being so jealously guarded in spite
of the concerns raised speaks volumes for its utility in providing a method for judicial con-
trol.67When viewed through the prism of private law, as Comyn J previously noted,68 cer-
tainty as to the rationale underlying the courts’ desire to exercise such control has at times
been far from clear. One possible explanation for the ongoing use of ‘recognisable psychi-
atric injury’ as the orthodox standard for a successful claim, in spite of the difficulty59. Gill, above n 50.
60. Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd [2008] EWHC 454.
61. Foroughi v Star City Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1503.
62. Calvert, above n 60, at 134 (Brigg J).
63. Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577 (CA) at 598 (Evans LJ).
64. Gill, above n 50.
65. DSM-V, above n 46, p 25.
66. Hussain v CC of West Mercia Constabulary [2003] EWCA Civ 1205.
67. See Group B Plaintiffs v UKMRC [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 161 (QB), Moorland J at 163
describing it as a ‘powerful control mechanism’.
68. Above n 1.
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
10 Legal Studiesinherent in applying the medical knowledge, is offered by Lord Justice Evans, who
commented that ‘in technical legal terms, damages for “normal” grief and suffering
may be said to be too remote to be recoverable in law’.69 Yet academic commentary70
and alternative judicial opinion71 would seem to refute this suggestion, instead noting that
policy concerns rather than legal principles underlie the courts’ attachment to such a high
orthodox standard; indeed, as seems clear, retention of such a standard has been for ‘rea-
sonsmore to dowith policy than logic’.72 AsGiliker73 has observed, these policy concerns
can seemingly be overcome in certain situations, as damages for the infliction of mental
distress falling below the threshold of recognisable psychiatric injury have been awarded
in the form of aggravated damages, provided that there is an accompanying physical in-
jury. Additionally, supplementary damages for mental distress may accompany ordinary
compensation in the case of intentionally inflicted torts, or torts that are actionable per se.
Crucially, this apparent recognition of more minor symptoms occurs in a subtle, almost
secretive fashion, with the courts remaining unwilling to openly acknowledge this as a
head of damages. In particular, there has been a refusal to consider any such award in
relation to negligence cases where policy objections have remained insurmountable.
Chief among these policy concerns74 is a desire to control the number of possible
claimants, so as to limit the financial liability that may be incurred by the state, private
insurance companies or private individuals, as such resources are ‘finite’.75 As Lord
Wilberforce noted, mental injury is ‘capable of affecting so wide a range of people,
[there is] a real need for the law to place some limitation on the extent of admissible
claims’.76 Yet the sheer number of limiting mechanisms developed by UK courts has
received extensive criticism.77 Rather than operating as occasional limiting factors, pol-
icy considerations have come to dominate any discussion on psychiatric injury claims.
In particular, the troublesome contemporary position in UK private law that differenti-
ates between primary and secondary victims serves as an excellent example of the pri-
macy afforded to policy considerations in English private law, with the controls applied
to secondary victims being a topic of considerable academic78 and judicial debate.79
The development and retention of these policy controls has seen the UK diverge widely
from other common law jurisdictions such as Australia where, in summarising the
position of the law in the UK, Gummow J observed that the policy controls were being
operated in an ‘arbitrary’ and ‘capricious’manner, further noting that such unprincipled
distinctions ‘bring the law into disrepute’.8069. Vernon, above n 63, at 604 (Evans LJ).
70. RMulheron ‘Rewriting the requirement for a “recognised psychiatric injury” in negligence
claims’ (2012) 32(1) Oxford J Legal Stud 77–112.
71. Alcock v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL) 422 at 418 (Lord Oliver).
72. White v London Fire & Civil Defence Authority [1999] 2 AC 410 at 511 (Lord Hoffman).
73. P Giliker ‘A “new” head of damages: damages for mental distress in the English law of
torts’ (2000) 20(1) Legal Stud 11–41.
74. Although certainly not the only such concern. For a comprehensive review, see Teff, above
n 27, pp 141–170.
75. Sion v Hampstead HA [1994] 5 Med LR 170 (CA) at 173 (Staughton LJ).
76. McLoughlin, above n 8, at 421 (Lord Wilberforce).
77. K Patten ‘Patchwork quilt law’ (2013) New L J, 24 May.
78. Ibid; Mulheron, above n 70; P Handford ‘Psychiatric Injury in breach of a relationship’
(2007) 27(1) Legal Stud 26–50.
79. See White, above n 6, at 496–498 (Lord Steyn) and at 504 (Lord Hoffmann).
80. Tame v New South Wales, Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 191 ALR 449 at 494
(Gummow JJ).
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 11Given that the development and maintenance of such seemingly controversial and
arbitrary restrictions has become one of the central preoccupations of civil courts in
the UK, particularly following the Hillsborough disaster, a more cynical view should
perhaps be taken of the Law Commission and the judiciary’s insistence that the diag-
nostic criteria and the orthodox standard of ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’ be retained
in spite of the obvious problems in application detailed above. Rather than being based
on a genuine misunderstanding as to the strengths and weaknesses of the diagnostic
process, retention of this standard seems to offer some additional arbitrary measure
of imagined diagnostic or scientific justification for financially driven policy decisions.
It is important to note that the purpose of highlighting this point is not to add further
criticism to the courts’ retention of policy controls in general. Rather, it is to emphasise
that such policy concerns should be entirely divorced from any discussion as to the
efficacy of retaining ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ as the de minimis threshold for
a successful claim in negligence. Indeed, by allowing the diagnostic criteria to be used
as such an additional means of judicial control law makers in the UK have left them-
selves at the mercy of ongoing developments in mental health sciences.
DEVELOPMENTS IN MENTAL HEALTH SCIENCE
As has been examined earlier, to suggest that there is ‘considerable international agree-
ment’81 is demonstrably false in terms of the number of divergent opinions that may
manifest between different, equally well-trained and experienced practitioners regard-
ing a single diagnosis. Crucially, the same may be said in terms of the levels of support
within the mental health professions for the criteria set out in the DSM generally. A key
concern has emerged regarding the presence of diagnostic inflation, which has seen a
dramatic increase in the numbers of individuals receiving a psychiatric diagnosis.82
The publication of the new DSM-V in 2013 has subsequently received extensive criti-
cism from within the ranks of mental health professionals; including high-profile con-
cerns raised by Robert Spitzer83 and Allen Frances,84 the chairmen of the DSM-III and
DSM-IV taskforces, respectively, regarding its likely impact on such diagnostic infla-
tion. Of central concern is the new appearance of the criteria, which have departed from
the relatively strict categorisations contained in the DSM-IV and are now more broadly
conceived, including new categories and lower diagnostic thresholds:
DSM-5 seems likely to convert diagnostic inflation into diagnostic hyperinflation by
adding new, questionable, and untested diagnoses, and by reducing the thresholds for81. Sutherland, above n 34, at 5 (Hale LJ).
82. RC Kessler et al ‘Prevalence, severity, and comorbidity of 12-month DSM-IV disorders in
the National Comorbidity Survey Replication’ (2005) 62(6) Arch Gen Psych 617–627 [published
correction appears in (2005) 62(7) Arch Gen Psych 709]; RC Kessler et al ‘Lifetime prevalence
and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Repli-
cation’ (2005) 62(6) Arch Gen Psych 593–602 [published correction appears in (2005) 62(7)
Arch Gen Psych 768].
83. B Carey ‘Psychiatrists revise the book of human troubles’ New York Times 17 December
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/health/18psych.html?pagewanted=all
(accessed 15 January 2015).
84. ‘Psychiatrists propose revision to diagnostic manual’ (Interview for PBS NewsHour 10
February 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health-jan-june10-mentalillness_
02-10/ (accessed 15 January 2015).
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12 Legal Studiesexisting diagnoses. Normal grief may be mislabeled as major depressive disorder,
temper tantrums become disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, normal forgetful-
ness in old age is now mild neurocognitive disorder, overeating is binge-eating dis-
order, and poor concentration is adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.85
These criticisms have been underlined by a perceived lack of transparency during the
consultation process leading up to publication, sparking fears that the pharmaceutical
industry was exerting undue influence to ensure that diagnostic criteria were lowered
so as to profit from the subsequent rise in diagnoses requiring medication.86 Similar
concerns have been raised by a number of psychological and psychiatric associations,
including the British Psychological Society which, in an open letter in 2011 stated:
The Society is concerned that clients and the general public are negatively affected by
the continued and continuous medicalisation of their natural and normal responses to
their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing consequences
which demand helping responses, but which do not reflect illnesses so much as nor-
mal individual variation.
Regardless of whether the courts’ purported adherence to the diagnostic criteria is
fuelled by a genuine desire to defer to mental health experts, or a need to provide jus-
tification for policy-based decisions, the possible lowering of the diagnostic threshold
leading to the ‘medicalisation’ of ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ responses has the potential
to dramatically increase the number of claimants who reach the required standard of
‘recognisable psychiatric illness’. While it is too early in the life of the DSM-V to reach
any firm conclusion as to the merits of such concerns, the mere suggestion that the di-
agnostic thresholds have been lowered must be of concern to the courts.
In response to these criticisms, advocates in favour of the new system, including
David Kupfer, the chair of the DSM-V taskforce, while acknowledging the relative
breadth of the new categories when compared with the DSM-IV, have refuted the sug-
gestion that diagnostic thresholds have been substantially lowered.87 Rather, it is sug-
gested that the DSM-V has a broader construction to ensure sensitivity to as many
symptoms and conditions as possible, but that the more explicit emphasis on the dimen-
sional assessment of the severity of symptoms contained within the manual will act as
an inbuilt check against diagnostic inflation.88 As mentioned above, Grayson89 has al-
ready observed that such a dimensional examination of symptoms already played an
important role in reaching a diagnosis; however, as Gill noted,90 the inclusion of such
additional measures in the DSM-IV was relatively subtle. In contrast, the DSM-V
explicitly includes a series of severity measures that are to be applied before a diagnosis
can be confirmed and appropriate intervention planned.85. A Frances and M Raven ‘Two views of the new DSM-5: the need for caution in diagnosing
and treating mental disorders’ (2013) 88(8) Am Fam Physician, available at http://www.aafp.org/
afp/2013/1015/od1.html (accessed 17 July 2015).
86. A Frances ‘Awarning sign on the road to DSM-V: beware of its unintended consequences’
Psychiatric Times 26 June 2009, available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/warning-
sign-road-dsm-v-beware-its-unintended-consequences?verify=0A (accessed 15 January 2015).
87. DJ Kupfer, EA Kuhl and DA Regier ‘Two views of the new DSM-5: a diagnostic guide rel-
evant to both primary care and psychiatric practice’ (2013) 88(8) Am Fam Physician, available at
http://www.aafp.org/afp/2013/1015/od2.html (accessed 17 July 2015).
88. Ibid.
89. Grayson, above n 53.
90. Gill, above n 50.
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 13While this attempt to more openly consider the dimensional component of condi-
tions may indeed serve to address concerns about diagnostic inflation, it is difficult
to see how such a change can have anything other than a negative impact on the util-
ity of the diagnostic manual in a legal context. The reasons for this are twofold.
First, as has already been discussed, the dimensional component of a diagnosis
has always been problematic for the courts, given their preference for a strictly
categorical answer as to the presence of any condition. That this dimensional
component is now set to play such an important role can only serve to accentuate
this problem. The second issue of concern relates to the time required to complete
a diagnosis. As previously discussed, experts who have been asked to reach a diag-
nosis for legal proceedings must operate within a finite timescale, but both the critics
and supporters of the DSM-V are in agreement that individual practitioners should
take a more longitudinal view of diagnoses, with greater care being taken before a
diagnosis is confirmed and medication prescribed.91 This call for a more longitudinal
approach must surely clash with the time constraints inherent in legal proceedings
and place yet further pressure on expert witnesses. As mentioned above, this is of
particular concern as attempting to expedite the diagnostic process for legal proceed-
ings has been a contributing factor in contradictory testimony from different experts,
which has in turn produced confusion and uncertainty.
Thus, even if the concerns raised about the lowering of the diagnostic thresholds
prove to be unfounded, the publication of the DSM-V seems set to accentuate the
existing difficulties inherent in applying diagnostic material in a legal environment.
Such developments within the mental health professions must surely undermine the
extent to which the court can, with confidence, rely on the diagnostic criteria – and,
indeed, increasingly contradictory expert testimony – while simultaneously attempting
to both limit the numbers of potential claimants and maintain the integrity of legal
proceedings.Policy concerns in the criminal law
Since criminal law has borrowed so heavily from private law with regard to psychiatric
injury and the need for expert testimony, these developments in the mental health sci-
ences must necessarily be a cause for concern. Yet the impact of such changes to the
diagnostic process is more difficult to gauge in respect of criminal law, as the underly-
ing rationale for the retention of such a high de minimis threshold in relation to the 1861
Act is less clear. The most persuasive policy argument offered to explain the reluctance
of UK courts, to extend criminal liability under the Offences Against the Person Act to
cases of ‘mere emotion’, is rooted in the same basic floodgates argument that applies in
private law.92 When applied in the context of criminal law, this argument manifests as
an awareness of the stigma attached to a criminal conviction, and the severity of the pos-
sible sanctions to be enforced against a guilty party. This is particularly relevant given
the propensity of everyday human interaction to provoke emotional responses of one
kind or another; as Teff stated, ‘Since much everyday conduct can have adverse emo-
tional effects on others, imposing penal sanctions too readily could inhibit socially
defensible behaviour.’9391. Frances and Raven, above n 86; Kupfer et al, above n 87.
92. Stannard, above n 26.
93. Teff, above n 27, p 31.
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14 Legal StudiesGiven this analysis, it would seem that fears regarding the lowering of diagnostic
thresholds, should they prove founded, could have a dramatic impact on the number
of cases that reach the de minimis standard, thus confounding any attempt to limit
criminal liability. However, while the desire to limit the unnecessary imposition of
penal sanctions is undoubtedly within the contemplation of the courts, there is less
evidence to suggest that the ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ test that necessitates re-
liance on the diagnostic criteria has been retained solely to facilitate this policy con-
cern. Rather, it would seem that in some instances attempts have already been made
to develop a more inclusive approach to mental harm suffered by victims of specific
crimes. In R v Brewster,94 Lord Bingham, the Lord Chief Justice of England and
Wales at the time, extolled the virtue of such an approach in relation to burglary
by making specific reference to the psychological impact that such a crime has on
individuals whose home has been broken into,95 and encouraged judges to acknowl-
edge this impact when considering sentencing.96 Perhaps more significantly, the Pro-
tection from Harassment Act 1997 already penalises behaviour that causes alarm or
distress, both mere emotions. Originally conceived as a legislative response to
stalkers,97 this Act has received a broad interpretation that covers all forms of harass-
ment.98 While some commentators have suggested that the courts’ reading of the Act
may result in it being of little use in domestic settings such as Dhaliwal,99 there can
be little doubt that this legislation gives the court a broader framework within which
to consider criminal sanctions for the infliction of more minor psychological harm.
In light of this apparent weakness in the floodgates argument, a more persuasive ex-
planation for the retention of the de minimis standard may be rooted in the ongoing use
of legislation from the middle part of the nineteenth century as the framework within
which all non-fatal injuries must be conceptualised. Lord Steyn has acknowledged the
difficulty inherent in devising a contemporary understanding of non-physical injury
within the current framework, noting that ‘The proposition that a Victorian Legislator
when enacting section 18, 20 and 47 of the Act 1861, would not have had in mind psy-
chiatric illness is no doubt correct. Psychiatry was in its infancy in 1861.’100 This in-
compatibility between this legislative framework dealing with offences against the
person and contemporary notions of non-physical injury has not gone unnoticed,
and several recommendations have been made suggesting reform of the law in this area
to be more inclusive of mental health issues and non-physical harm. The Law Com-
mission has made several such recommendations, including the use of more contem-
porary language that would be more nuanced and inclusive of broader definitions of
harm and victimhood, specifically in relation to non-physical harm.101 Subsequently,
the Home Office has explored wide-ranging reform of the legislation relating to non-fatal
injury by consulting about a possible Offences Against the Person Bill that would include
a wider definition of ‘injury’ to include ‘any impairment of an individual’s mental94. R v Brewster [1998] 1 Cr App R 220.
95. See M Maguire and T Bennett Burglary in a Dwelling (London: Heinemann, 1982).
96. R v Brewster, above n 95, at 225–227 (Lord Bingham).
97. N Addison and T Lawson-Cruttenden Harassment Law and Practice (London: Blackstone
Press, 1997).
98. ‘DPP v Selvanayagam’ The Times 23 June 1999 (Collins J).
99. Stannard, above n 26.
100. R v Burrows, R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 (Lord Steyn).
101. Law Commission Report No 218 Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the
Person and General Principles (London: HMSO, 1993).
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 15health’.102 While the adoption of such a contemporary Bill would undoubtedly have
provided the courts a broader framework within which to consider issues pertaining
to non-physical injury, as of yet these proposed reforms have not been implemented.
In the absence of a more contemporary framework within which to define non-phys-
ical harm, it is difficult to imagine how the courts could include more minor symp-
toms without stretching the meaning of the 1861 Act past the point of credulity.
An alternative justification for retaining recognisable psychiatric injury as the
de minimis standard in relation to the 1861 Act was offered by Sir Igor Judge
who, in the Dhaliwal case, focused on the need for certainty, by commenting that
allowing contemplation of more minor symptoms would lead to ‘problems of
conflicting medical opinion’.103 Yet, as has been discussed, such problems already
exist in numerous cases, including Dhaliwal. Indeed, this argument would seem to
reaffirm the mistaken judicial belief that mental health practitioners apply a simple
‘yes’ or ‘no’ test of severity in reaching a clinical diagnosis. While this argument
fails to fully explain retention of the de minimis standard in relation to the 1861
Act, it does highlight the importance attached to certainty in legal proceedings and
recognition of how damaging conflicting medical opinion can be. Crucially, it is here
that the changes in the diagnostic process caused by the publication of the DSM-V
are likely to have the most damaging impact on both criminal and private law. As
has been discussed, the dimensional element of a diagnosis, which has always
proved to be a difficult consideration for the courts, seems set to become an even
more important factor for mental health practitioners following the publication of
the new diagnostic manual. This change, when coupled with the already imperfect
application of medical knowledge within the legal environment, is likely to
produce greater levels of disagreement between experts, adding yet further confusion
and uncertainty.
The case for reform
In light of these concerns regarding the fundamental compatibility between the diagnos-
tic criteria and the legal setting in which they are being asked to operate, several aca-
demic commentators have questioned the wisdom of their continued influence in the
courtroom. To circumvent this problem, it has been suggested that in the context of pri-
vate law, the basic standard of ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’, which necessitates re-
liance on diagnostic criteria, should be lowered, and that instead the court should seek to
determine if the claimant has developed a psychological condition ‘sufficiently differ-
ent’ from normal human emotions.104 In advancing this argument, Mulheron has
highlighted many of the issues pertaining to interpretation and compatibility discussed
above and has drawn on a growing body of judicial opinion that would seem to suggest
support for lowering the threshold for a successful negligence claim.105 Similar calls for
a lowering of diagnostic thresholds have also been made in the context of criminal law,
particularly from commentators who, notwithstanding the broad scope of the Protection
from Harassment Act, have highlighted the perceived deference with which the crimi-
nal process views the rights of the defendant, and they have contrasted it with the102. Home Office Violence: Reforming the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (London:
Home Office, 1998).
103. R v Dhaliwal [2006] EWCA Crim 1139 at 33 (Judge).
104. TWard ‘Psychiatric evidence and judicial fact finding’ (1999) 3 Int J Evidence 180 at 187.
105. Mulheron, above n 70.
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16 Legal Studiesrelative insensitivity that has characterised the traditional approach to victims.106 They
have argued that while concerns as to the danger of criminalising everyday behaviours
and interactions are certainly relevant, so too should be a more complete and inclusive
awareness of the emotional cost borne by victims of non-physical injury.107
On initial inspection, the composition of the DSM-V, with broader categorisations of
conditions, may seem to help facilitate such a change without the need for reform. How-
ever, the previous calls for a lowering of the diagnostic threshold were predicated on the
assumption that any such change should be achieved and managed by the courts, so as
to ensure easier application of medical knowledge within the legal framework. While
reliance on the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-V may achieve the desired lower thresh-
old, for the reasons outlined above, it is highly unlikely to facilitate greater compatibil-
ity. In point of fact, the central importance of dimensional assessments seems likely to
foster even greater interpretative difficulties. This problem is likely to be greatly mag-
nified if law makers adopt a passive stance and refuse to engage with these issues.
An alternative solution that would encourage more proactive engagement was sug-
gested in Australia, where the Ipp committee, while failing to recommend a reduction
in the ‘recognised psychiatric illness’ threshold, was highly sceptical regarding the con-
tinued usefulness of the diagnostic criteria contained in both the ICD-10 and the DSM
for legal proceedings, going so far as to recommend their replacement with a different
set of guidelines drawn up specifically for legal purposes in conjunction with mental
health experts.108 The advantage of such an approach is that it would permit the courts
to exercise greater control with regard to the issues of central importance to mental
health diagnoses from a legal standpoint, while simultaneously assisting expert wit-
nesses to better understand which particular elements of a clinical diagnosis are relevant
to the courts. In the UK, such suggestions have previously been considered and rejected
by the Law Commission on grounds of practicality,109 further noting the continued im-
portance of the diagnostic criteria contained in these manuals to the psychiatric
profession.110
Yet there is evidence to suggest that in certain circumstances the courts have already
been willing to engage directly with mental health issues to devise diagnostic guide-
lines. The emergence of battered woman syndrome (BWS) as a relevant consideration
in cases where abused partners retaliate is an excellent example of this. BWS and other
associated symptoms have played a pivotal role in a series of successful appeals;111 and
its influence can be readily identified when examining the defence of loss of control,112
which has replaced the old defence of provocation. First outlined byWalker, a psychol-
ogist, in the 1970s, and substantially revised in 1992113 and 2006,114 BWS attempts to106. J Doak ‘The victim and the criminal process: an analysis of recent trends in regional and
international tribunals’ (2002) 23 Legal Stud 1.
107. Stannard, above n 26.
108. ‘Mental harm’ in ‘Review of the law of negligence: final report’ (2002) (‘Ipp report’) as
yet unenacted.
109. Law Commission Report No 249, above n 3, para 5.1.
110. Ibid, para 3.2.
111. R v Ahluwalia [1993] 96 Cr App R 133; R v Thornton [1995] 1 Cr App R 578.
112. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
113. LE Walker ‘Battered women syndrome and self-defense’ (1992) 6(2) Notre Dame J L
Ethics & Pub Pol’y 321–334.
114. LEWalker ‘Battered woman syndrome: empirical findings’ (2006) 1087 Annals NYAcad
Sci 142–157.
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 17explain and categorise the experiences common to women who had experienced spou-
sal abuse. Advocates of this syndrome have suggested that women who are exposed to
sustained violence become dissociated, exhibiting signs of depression, helplessness and
hopelessness that serve to restrict their capacity to leave abusive relationships.115 As
Schuller and Hastings contend, the emergence of BWS as a relevant consideration
can doubtless be explained by the apparent legitimacy of such a diagnosis.116 Yet sev-
eral flaws in methodology and scientific validation exist relating to this syndrome in
each of its incarnations, most notable among which is the fact that it is not classified
in any version of the DSM.117
BWS was originally conceptualised as ‘learned helplessness’, in an attempt to ex-
plain the passivity of abused women and their apparent inability to leave their relation-
ships.118 Yet this characterisation has been refuted by empirical evidence that suggests
that passivity may actually be a response designed by abused women to minimise vio-
lence.119 Early versions of BWS also focused on the behaviour of the abuser, describing
a cycle of violence including ‘tension building’, ‘acute battering’ and ‘contrite lov-
ing’.120 However, empirical evidence in support of the cycle of violence is hard to come
by, and as one commentator noted, the evidence that does exist is not entirely convinc-
ing.121 Subsequent definitions of BWS were intentionally revised to be synonymous
with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),122 a condition that is listed in the DSM
and that has been empirically linked to cases of relationship violence.123 Yet, as Dutton
has noted, empirical support for PTSD should not be confused for empirical support for
BWS, as ‘there is no “type” of PTSD called BWS’.124
In spite of the relatively weak methodological rigour that has been employed in de-
vising BWS, even its most ardent critics would concede that it has done much to high-
light the plight of abused partners, and has helped to focus the attention of mental health
researchers on the symptoms that may manifest in individuals who have experienced
psychological and physical abuse.125 Evidence now suggests that while symptoms of
this kind may be common in individuals who have sustained such abuse, they will be
experienced differently by each individual126 and at times may not present as115. LE Walker ‘Battered women and learned helplessness’ (1977) 2(3–4) Victimology
525–534.
116. RA Schuller and PAHastings ‘Trials of battered women who kill: the impact of alternative
forms of expert evidence’ (1996) 20(2) Law & Hum Behav 167–187.
117. M Dutton ‘Update of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” critique’ (2009) VAWnet: The
National Online Resource Center on Violence Against Women, available at http://www.vawnet.
org/summary.php?doc_id=2061&find_type=web_desc_AR (accessed 15 January 2015).
118. Walker, above n 115.
119. C Peterson, SF Maier and MEP Seligman Learned Helplessness: A Theory for the Age of
Personal Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); L Goodman et al ‘The Intimate
Partner Violence Strategies Index: development and application’ (2003) 9(2) Violence Against
Women 163–186.
120. LE Walker The Battered Women Syndrome (New York: Springer, 1984).
121. Dutton, above n 117.
122. Walker, above nn 114, 115.
123. ED Krause et al ‘Longitudinal factor structure of posttraumatic stress symptoms related to
intimate partner violence’ (2007) 19(2) Psychol Assessment 165–175.
124. Dutton, above n 117, at 6.
125. Ibid.
126. MA Dutton et al ‘Traumatic responses among battered women who kill’ (1994) 7(4)
J Traumatic Stress 549–564.
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18 Legal Studiessufficiently severe to merit a clinical diagnosis.127 Indeed, at times such a clinical diag-
nosis may be unhelpful, as it may characterise as ‘abnormal’ a series of responses that
should rightly be viewed as reasonable. Yet the courts are seemingly alive to the impor-
tance of more minor symptoms, at least as they relate to battered women who kill, as
evidenced by the judgment of Lord Justice Rose in R v Smith, when he accepted that
‘more minor symptoms are relevant to provocation,128 when they may not be to dimin-
ished responsibility’.129
That BWS has played such an important role in the direction that the criminal law has
taken with regard not only to a series of high-profile cases but also the revised statutory
approach to provocation/loss of control, is perhaps surprising given the apparent reluc-
tance of law makers to engage with diagnostic issues. Yet the purpose of highlighting
the inclusion of a diagnostically weak ‘syndrome’ in the courts’ considerations is not to
criticise. That the courts can rightly claim to have helped shape the evolution of research
into the psychological impact of domestic abuse while simultaneously establishing
which symptoms are of particular relevance in a legal context is perhaps the best exam-
ple of the legal profession engaging with mental health sciences in a proactive way. The
adoption of such a nuanced and engaged understanding in relation to domestic abuse
stands in stark contrast to the passive acceptance of the diagnostic guidelines in relation
to psychiatric injury generally. Crucially, this approach would seem to undermine con-
cerns regarding the practicality of devising a set of diagnostic guidelines for legal
purposes.CONCLUSION
The retention of ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ as the de minimis threshold for both a
successful claim in negligence, and prosecution under the 1861 Act, has received exten-
sive scholarly criticism, with repeated calls having been made for a new threshold in-
clusive of more minor symptoms. While there is undoubtedly merit in discussing the
possible inclusion of more minor symptoms, this paper contends that the main problem
caused by retention of such a high threshold is the increasingly passive position adopted
by the Law Commission and legislators regarding expert testimony and, by extension,
the diagnostic guidelines that help mental health practitioners to diagnose psychiatric
conditions. Of central concern is the difficulty inherent in adequately incorporating this
medical knowledge in a legal setting that places different emphasis on the importance of
reliable diagnoses than that which is seen in normal clinical settings. This has resulted in
repeated disagreements between experts as to the correct diagnosis, leading to conflict-
ing testimony and inconsistencies in levels of judicial support for such evidence.
In spite of this, the Law Commission and certain judges have seemingly been con-
vinced of the central importance of the diagnostic guidelines, noting their importance
to the mental health professions. Yet it is crucial to note that any importance attached
to these criteria by mental health practitioners is predicated on their utility in a clinical
setting, not a legal one. Further, as has been discussed, universal acceptance of the di-
agnostic criteria amongst mental health professionals is a debatable point, particularly127. LM Short et al ‘Survivors’ identification of protective factors and early warning signs for
intimate partner violence’ (2000) 6(3) Violence Against Women 272–285.
128. Note that this case occurred before the new loss of control defence came into being; hence
the reference to provocation.
129. R v Smith [2002] EWCA Crim 2671 at 40 (Rose LJ).
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The problems with English law and psychiatric injury 19following publication of the DSM-5, which seems set to exacerbate these pre-existing
difficulties concerning the application of medical knowledge within a legal setting. In
light of this, continued attempts to rely on these diagnostic guidelines in a legal context
are analogous with trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. The most obvious solu-
tion to this problem is the development of new diagnostic guidelines specifically de-
signed for use in a legal setting. Such a suggestion has previously been dismissed as
impractical, and yet – as has been demonstrated – the courts’ proactive participation
in establishing BWS as a relevant consideration in domestic abuse cases, despite its
omission from the DSM, would seem to confirm both the practicality and importance
of properly adapting medical knowledge before attempting to apply it in court.© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
